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Abstract
We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly in a diﬀerentiated product
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thus robust if the degree of product diﬀerentiation is high. We also ﬁnd that regardless of
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1 Introduction
Until the 1980s, public enterprises played a leading role in the Japanese economy. For example,
it was believed that lending by public ﬁnancial institutions (e.g., the Development Bank of
Japan) had a pump-priming eﬀect on lending by private banks. Furthermore, public ﬁnancing
occupied an important position in the Japanese ﬁnancial markets for over 40 years.1 From
the 1980s, public enterprises underwent major reforms.2 The Koizumi Cabinet (April 2001–
September 2006) changed this by declaring that public ﬁrms should play a complementary role
to private ﬁrms, with the latter leading the markets rather than the former. As a result, major
public institutions were substantially downscaled.
Such a situation can be described by a simple model in a homogeneous product market
formulated by Pal (1998). He adopted the observable delay game formulated by Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990) and investigated the endogenous role in mixed duopolies where public
and private ﬁrms compete.3 He showed that private leadership yields greater welfare than
public leadership does. Although both public and private leadership equilibria exist in a mixed
duopoly, he suggested that private leadership is more natural and robust. Subsequently, many
researchers have proven that his conclusion is adequate. Matsumura and Ogawa (2010) showed
1 See Horiuchi and Sui (1993). It is globally observed that public sectors play an important role in lending
markets. See Bose et al. (2013).
2 For example, three major state-owned public enterprises, the Japan Railway group, Japan Tobacco Incor-
porated, and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, were privatized.
3 The literature on mixed oligopolies has rich and diverse discussions on the observable delay game. Tomaru
and Kiyono (2010) generalized the demand and cost functions. Matsumura (2003b) introduced foreign compe-
tition. Tomaru and Saito (2010) considered a subsidized mixed duopoly, and Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) investigated
price competition and showed that Bertrand emerges in a mixed duopoly. Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Sedano (2011)
discussed a diﬀerent type of objective in a public ﬁrm. For the importance of sequential-move games in mixed
oligopolies, see also Heywood and Ye (2009a), Ino and Matsumura (2010), Wang and Mukherjee (2012), and
Wang and Lee (2013). For the recent development of mixed oligopolies, see also Ishida and Matsushima (2009),
Bose et al. (2013), and Matsumura and Tomaru (2013).
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that private leadership is risk-dominant in his model. They also adopted a partial privatization
approach formulated by Matsumura (1998) and showed the advantage of private leadership,
that is, the range for the degree of privatization that yields private leadership equilibrium is
wider than that for public leadership equilibrium. Capuano and De Feo (2010) introduced
the shadow cost of public funds into Pal’s model and showed that unless the shadow cost is
too high, one of the following results holds: (i) the unique equilibrium is a private leadership
equilibrium; (ii) both public and private leadership equilibria exist and the private leadership
equilibrium is risk-dominant.4 Matsumura (2003a) used diﬀerent endogenous timing games
(two-production period models) formulated by Saloner (1987) and Pal (1991) and showed that
only the private leadership equilibrium is robust. These results suggest that private leadership
that is better for social welfare is more likely to occur in endogenous timing games.
However, public institutions have recently begun to once more lead the Japanese mar-
kets. Newly established public ﬁnancial institutions such as Industrial Revitalization Corpo-
ration of Japan, Enterprise Turnaround Initiative Corporation of Japan, and Regional Econ-
omy Vitalization Corporation of Japan play leading roles in ﬁnancial markets. The Nikkei,
a Japanese newspaper, calls this situation “Kiko Capitalism (State Institution Capitalism)”
(Nikkei, November 22, 2011). Furthermore, this type of capitalism is still expanding under
the current Abe Cabinet (Nikkei, October 8, 2013). Following the literature results previously
mentioned, welfare-maximizing public institutions are naturally followers rather than leaders.
Thus, we question whether such state institution capitalism implies that the public sector does
not seek to maximize welfare.
A notable feature of these recently established ﬁnancial institutions is that they supply
highly diﬀerentiated rather than homogeneous services. In addition to supplying money, these
4 If the shadow cost is high, the unique equilibrium is a Cournot.
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institutions provide consulting and auditing services and play an important role in business
revitalization and ﬁrm reconstruction. These services are usually highly diﬀerentiated.
In this study, we introduce product diﬀerentiation using Dixit’s (1979) model. First, we
investigate a case where the private competitor is a domestic ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that regardless of
the degree of product diﬀerentiation, (i) two equilibria (i.e., private and public leadership) exist,
and (ii) private leadership is better than public leadership for social welfare. Nevertheless, the
public leadership equilibrium is risk-dominant, and thus, it is robust if the degree of product
diﬀerentiation is high.
When the product is highly diﬀerentiated, the public ﬁrm’s optimal output is less sensitive
to the private leader’s output. Thus, it becomes diﬃcult for the private ﬁrm, as the leader, to
reduce the public ﬁrm’s output. Therefore, the private ﬁrm is reluctant to lead. This causes
risk dominance of the public leadership equilibrium.
Our results contain the following important implications. From a social welfare perspec-
tive, public leadership is not the best solution. Nevertheless, even welfare-maximizing public
institutions naturally choose a leading role when the degree of product diﬀerentiation is high.
In such a situation, the public ﬁrm’s commitment to not be the leader can improve welfare.5
Next, we investigate a case in which the private ﬁrm is foreign. In the literature on mixed
oligopolies, it is known that foreign ownership in private ﬁrms often matters as long as the
public ﬁrm maximizes domestic welfare.6 We ﬁnd that regardless of the degree of product
diﬀerentiation, (i) two equilibria (private and public leadership) exist, (ii) public leadership
is better than private leadership for social welfare, and (iii) the public leadership equilibrium
5 For a discussion on this commitment, see Ino and Matsumura (2010).
6 For pioneering works discussing foreign competition in mixed oligopolies, see Corneo and Jeanne (1994),
Fjell and Pal (1996), and Pal and White (1998). Foreign ownership is important in the context of public policies
in mixed oligopolies. See also Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005a, b), Heywood and Ye (2009b), and Lin and
Matsumura (2012).
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1 \ 2 Cooperation Non-Cooperation
Cooperation (A,a) (B, b)
Non-Cooperation (C,c) (D, d)
Table 1: Payoﬀ matrix of the example.
is risk-dominant, and thus, it is robust. Therefore, public leadership is more likely to emerge
when the competitor is foreign. This may also explain the revival of public ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in Japan, because there are foreign ﬁrms in corporate revitalization markets that are
main competitors of Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan, Enterprise Turnaround
Initiative Corporation of Japan, and Regional Economy Vitalization Corporation of Japan.
We now brieﬂy explain the concept of risk dominance in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and why
we use this criterion as an equilibrium choice to investigate which of the two equilibria is robust.
We explain the concept of risk dominance using a two-player, two-strategy example (Table 1).
Suppose that there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, (Cooperation, Cooperation) and
(Non-Cooperation, Non-Cooperation), that is, A > C, a > b, D > B, and d > c are satisﬁed.
Suppose that A > D and a > d, that is, both players prefer (Cooperation, Cooperation) to
(Non-Cooperation, Non-Cooperation). This example is a (non-pure) coordination game under
these assumptions. Players 1 and 2 agree to cooperate if they can communicate and trust each
other. However, if it is unknown whether the rival will cooperate, each player faces risk; thus,
players might choose their strategy to reduce this risk. (Non-Cooperation, Non-Cooperation)
risk dominates (Cooperation, Cooperation) if the product of the deviation losses is higher for
(Non-Cooperation, Non-Cooperation), that is, (D−B)(d−c) > (A−C)(a−b). This inequality
is more likely satisﬁed when C and b are small. When C and b are small, each player’s payoﬀ
becomes small if the rival chooses Non-Cooperation. Thus, each player faces serious risk even
if (s)he suspects that the other player expects that the equilibrium (Non-Cooperation, Non-
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Cooperation) is chosen. To avoid this risk, each player chooses Non-Cooperation even if (s)he
is risk neutral. Moreover, the risk-dominant equilibrium is evolutionary stable (Harsanyi and
Selten, 1988).
Payoﬀ dominance is another popular concept of equilibrium choice. In the previous exam-
ple, the (Cooperation, Cooperation) payoﬀ-dominates (Non-Cooperation, Non-Cooperation),
because both players prefer (Cooperation, Cooperation) to (Non-Cooperation, Non-Cooperation).
If B and c are large and C and b are small, (Non-Cooperation, Non-Cooperation) risk domi-
nates (Cooperate, Cooperate). Therefore, risk dominance and payoﬀ dominance may suggest
a diﬀerent robust equilibrium in the general context. Thus, whether we adopt risk dominance
or payoﬀ dominance is crucial.
In this study, we adopt risk dominance to select a robust equilibrium. There are two reasons
why we adopt risk dominance rather than payoﬀ dominance as the criterion of equilibrium
choice. First, it is possible that neither of the two equilibria payoﬀs dominates the other.
In the previous example, if we replace the assumption a > d with a < d (i.e., the so-called
“battle of sexes”), we cannot determine which of the two equilibria is robust. Risk dominance
has no such problem in the generic case. Second, Matsumura and Ogawa (2009) showed that
in the observable delay game, if one equilibrium payoﬀ-dominates the other, this equilibrium
also risk-dominates the other. In other words, there is no conﬂict between two concepts in the
observable delay game, in contrast to other games such as (non-pure) coordination games. Our
result that public leadership equilibrium risk dominates private leadership equilibrium implies
that private leadership equilibrium never payoﬀ-dominates the public leadership one. Thus, we
believe that adopting risk dominance is plausible in the general context, and that it is further
reasonable in the observable delay game.7
7 In the literature on the endogenous timing game, risk dominance is a fairly powerful and popular tool
for equilibrium choice. See van Damme and Hurkens (2004), Amir and Stepanova (2006), and Hirata and
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2 The Model
Firms 0 and 1 produce diﬀerentiated commodities, and the inverse demand function is given by
pi = α−βqi−βδqj (i = 0, 1, i = j), where pi and qi are ﬁrm i’s price and quantity respectively,
α, β are positive constants and δ ∈ (0, 1). The marginal production costs are constant. Let mi
denote ﬁrm i’s marginal cost. We assume that α > m0 ≥ m1.8
Firm 0 is a state-owned public ﬁrm, and its payoﬀ is the total social surplus given by
SW = (p0 −m0)q0 + (p1 −m1)q1 +
[
α(q0 + q1)− β(q
2
0 + 2δq0q1 + q
2
1)
2
− p0q0 − p1q1
]
(≡ V0).
The quasi-linear utility function of a representative consumer, U(q0, q1) = α(q0 + q1)− β(q20 +
2δq0q1 + q
2
1)/2 − (p0q0 + p1q1), provides the demand and consumer surplus functions adopted
in this study. Firm 1 is a private ﬁrm and its payoﬀ is its own proﬁt, π1 = (p1−m1)q1 (≡ V1).
The game runs as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm i (i = 0, 1) simultaneously chooses whether
to move early (ti = 1) or late (ti = 2). The basic game is then played using simultaneous play
if both ﬁrms choose the same period, and sequential play otherwise. See Table 2 for the payoﬀ
matrix of the observable delay game in our environment, where V Fi (res. V
L
i ) denotes ﬁrm i’s
equilibrium payoﬀ in the sequential-move game when it is the follower (res. leader), and V Ni
denotes each ﬁrm’s equilibrium payoﬀ in the simultaneous-move game (Nash).
Table 2: Payoﬀ matrix of the observable delay game.
0\1 t1 = 1 t1 = 2
t0 = 1
(
V N0 , V
N
1
) (
V L0 , V
F
1
)
t0 = 2
(
V F0 , V
L
1
) (
V N0 , V
N
1
)
Matsumura (2011). For a convincing rationalization of this concept, see van Damme and Hurkens (2004).
8The assumption that m0 ≥ m1 is popular in the literature and we believe that this is a reasonable
assumption. For the theoretical and empirical discussion on the cost diﬀerence between public and private
ﬁrms, see Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) and Megginson and Netter (2001), respectively. However, we
can show that our results hold without this assumption unless the diﬀerence of these two costs is too large.
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3 Fixed Timing Games
In this section, we discuss the second stage game given t0 and t1. Let ai ≡ α−mi. We assume
that the following three games have interior solutions.
3.1 Cournot (t0 = t1 = 1 or t0 = t1 = 2)
First, we consider the simultaneous-move game (Cournot competition). Each ﬁrm maximizes
its payoﬀ Vi with respect to qi. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂V0
∂q0
= a0 − q0β − q1βδ = 0,
∂V1
∂q1
= a1 − 2q1β − q0βδ = 0.
The second-order conditions are satisﬁed. From the ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain the fol-
lowing reaction functions for ﬁrms 0 and 1, respectively:
R0 =
a0 − q1βδ
β
,
R1 =
a1 − q0βδ
2β
.
These functions lead to the following equilibrium quantities:
qN0 =
2a0 − δa1
β(2− δ2) ,
qN1 =
a1 − δa0
β(2− δ2) .
The resulting welfare and ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt are, respectively,
V N0 ≡ SWN =
4a20 − 6a0a1δ + 3a21 + 2a0a1δ3 − a20δ2 − a21δ2
2(2− δ2)2β ,
V N1 ≡ πN1 =
(a1 − a0δ)2
(2− δ2)2β .
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3.2 Stackelberg with Public Leadership (t0 = 1, t1 = 2)
Second, we consider the sequential-move game where ﬁrm 1 chooses q1 = R1(q0) and ﬁrm 0
maximizes its payoﬀ, V0(q0, R1(q0)). We have
qL0 =
4a0 − 3a1δ
β(4− 3δ2) ,
qF1 =
2(a1 − a0δ)
β(4− 3δ2) .
The resulting welfare and ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt are, respectively,
V L0 ≡ SWL =
4a20 − 6a0a1δ + 3a21
2(4− 3δ2)β ,
V F1 ≡ πF1 =
4(a1 − a0δ)2
(4− 3δ2)2β .
3.3 Stackelberg with Private Leadership (t0 = 2, t1 = 1)
Third, we consider the sequential-move game where ﬁrm 0 chooses q0 = R0(q1) and ﬁrm 1
maximizes its payoﬀ, V1(R0(q1), q1). We have
qF0 =
2a0 − a1δ − a0δ2
2(1− δ)(1 + δ)β ,
qL1 =
a1 − a0δ
2(1− δ)(1 + δ)β .
The resulting welfare and ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt are, respectively,
V L0 ≡ SWL =
4a20 − 6a0a1δ + 3a21 − a20δ2
8(1− δ)(1 + δ)β ,
V F1 ≡ πF1 =
(a1 − a0δ)2
4(1− δ)(1 + δ)β .
3.4 Result
Discussing the ﬁrst stage choice, we present our main result.
9
Proposition 1 (i) For any δ ∈ (0, 1), both (t0, t1) = (1, 2) (public leadership) and (t0, t1) =
(2, 1) (private leadership) constitute equilibria. (ii) There exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the public
(res. private) leadership equilibrium is risk-dominant if δ < (res. >) δ∗.
Proof
(i) The following inequalities directly indicate Proposition 1(i).
V L0 − V N0 =
δ2(a1 − a0δ)2
2β(4− 3δ2)(2− δ2)2 > 0,
V N0 − V F0 = −
δ2(a1 − a0δ)2(2− δ)(2 + δ)
8β(1− δ)(1 + δ)(2− δ2)2 < 0,
V L1 − V N1 =
δ4(a1 − a0δ)2
4β(1− δ)(1 + δ)(2− δ2)2 > 0,
V N1 − V F1 = −
δ2(a1 − a0δ)2(8− 5δ2)
(4− 3δ2)2(2− δ2)2 < 0.
(ii) In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the following two equalities regarding probabilities
Pri(δ) that the ﬁrm i moves early are satisﬁed:
Pr1(δ)V
N
0 + (1− Pr1(δ))V L0 = Pr1(δ)V F0 + (1− Pr1(δ))V N0
=⇒ Pr1(δ) = V
L
0 − V N0
V L0 + V
F
0 − 2V N0
=
4(1− δ)(1 + δ)
3δ4 − 20δ2 + 20 .
P r0(δ)V
N
1 + (1− Pr0(δ))V L1 = Pr0(δ)V F1 + (1− Pr0(δ))V N1
=⇒ Pr0(δ) = V
L
1 − V N1
V L1 + V
F
1 − 2V N1
=
(4− 3δ2)2δ2
9δ6 − 4δ2 − 36δ2 + 32 .
(t0, t1) = (1, 2) risk dominates (t0, t1) = (2, 1) if Pr0(δ)(1−Pr1(δ)) < (1−Pr0(δ))Pr1(δ), that
is, Pr0(δ) < Pr1(δ) (see Harsanyi and Selten 1988).
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We have
Pr0(0) = 0,
∂Pr0
∂δ
=
8δ(2− δ2)(4− 3δ2)(15δ4 − 28δ2 + 16)
(9δ6 − 4δ2 − 36δ2 + 32)2 > 0,
P r0(1) = 1,
P r1(0) =
1
5
,
∂Pr0
∂δ
= − 24δ
3(2− δ2)
(3δ4 − 20δ2 + 20)2 < 0,
P r1(1) = 0.
Therefore, there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that Pr0(δ∗) = Pr1(δ∗). For δ < (res. >) δ∗, Pr0 <
(res. >) Pr1. Q.E.D.
Solving Pr0(δ) = Pr1(δ) for δ, we obtain δ
∗ ≈ 0.6546. As we discuss later, the private ﬁrm
prefers public leadership to private leadership when δ is not so close to 1. When δ is smaller
(i.e., the product is more diﬀerentiated), the public ﬁrm’s optimal output is less sensitive to
the private leader’s output.9 Thus, it becomes diﬃcult for the private ﬁrm, as the leader,
to reduce the public ﬁrm’s output. Therefore, the private ﬁrm is reluctant to lead. In other
words, the private ﬁrm has a stronger incentive to choose period 2 when δ is smaller. Given
this incentive of the private ﬁrm, the public ﬁrm is also reluctant to choose period 2. If the
private ﬁrm chooses period 2 and the public ﬁrm also chooses period 2, ﬁrms face Cournot
competition. The public ﬁrm prefers the public leadership to Cournot, and thus, ﬁrm 2 has
weaker incentive to choose period 2 when δ is smaller. Thus, public leadership payoﬀ-dominates
and risk-dominates private leadership when δ is small.
9Similarly, the private ﬁrm’s optimal output is less sensitive to the public leader’s output when δ is smaller.
However, the private ﬁrm’s optimal output is less sensitive to the rival’s output and δ than the public ﬁrm’s,
and thus, a change in δ more signiﬁcantly aﬀects the leader’s incentive when the follower is the public ﬁrm
than when it is the private ﬁrm.
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We now present a result on welfare.
Proposition 2 (i) For any δ ∈ (0, 1), private leadership is better than public leadership for
social welfare. (ii) The private firm prefers public leadership to private leadership if and only
if δ < δ∗∗ = 2
√
2/3 ≈ 0.9428.
Proof The following ﬁrst equation shown below directly indicates (i), and the second implies
(ii):
SW F − SWL = 3(a1 − a0δ)
2δ2
8(4− 3δ2)(1− δ)(1 + δ)β > 0,
πL1 − πF1 =
(a1 − a0δ)2(9δ2 − 8)δ2
4(4− 3δ2)2(1− δ)(1 + δ)β =⇒ sign(π
L
1 − πF1 ) = sign(9δ2 − 8). Q.E.D.
We have already explained why the private ﬁrm prefers public leadership to private lead-
ership when δ is large (Proposition 2-ii). Proposition 2-i states that private leadership is more
eﬃcient than public leadership for social welfare. The private ﬁrm produces more aggressively
in the private leadership case than in the Cournot case (simultaneous-move case) because the
leader, the private ﬁrm, has an incentive to reduce the rival’s output. This more aggressive
behavior of the leader results in less aggressive behavior of the public ﬁrm. Because the public
(resp. private) ﬁrm’s output is larger (resp. smaller) than the ﬁrst best output, changes in
both ﬁrms’ outputs improve welfare. In contrast, the leader, the public ﬁrm, produces less
aggressively in the public leadership case than in the Cournot case because the leader has an
incentive to increase the rival’s output to improve welfare. This less aggressive behavior of the
leader results in more aggressive behavior of the public ﬁrm. Thus, both public and private
leadership improves welfare than the Cournot case. The improvement is signiﬁcant because
the absolute value of the slope of the public ﬁrm’s reaction curve, |∂R0/∂q1|, is larger than
that of the private ﬁrm’s reaction curve, |∂R1/∂q0|. Therefore, the leader’s strategic incentive
for manipulating the follower is larger (and thus, the welfare-improving eﬀect is stronger) in
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the private leadership case than in the public leadership case. This leads to Proposition 2-ii.
Proposition 1-ii and 2-i imply that the less eﬃcient equilibrium is risk-dominant when the
degree of product diﬀerentiation is high. Private leadership yields greater welfare than public
leadership does regardless of the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Private leadership yields
larger proﬁt for the private ﬁrm than the private leadership does unless the degree of product
diﬀerentiation is low, and thus, it has a strong incentive to follow. This makes the less eﬃcient
equilibrium, namely, public leadership, more robust when δ is small. By contrast, if δ is large,
both ﬁrms prefers the private leadership to the public one. In other words, there is no conﬂict of
interest between the two ﬁrms for each ﬁrm’s respective role. In this case the private leadership
risk-dominates the public leadership.10
4 Foreign Competitor
In this study, we assume that the private ﬁrm is domestic. However, in the literature on
mixed oligopolies, it is known that foreign ownership in private ﬁrms often changes the results
drastically. If the private ﬁrm is domestic, a domestic welfare-maximizer is concerned with
both consumer surplus and the proﬁts of both ﬁrms. However, if the private ﬁrm is foreign
(i.e., it is owned by foreign investors), the welfare-maximizer is only concerned with consumer
surplus and the domestic public ﬁrm’s proﬁt. This changes the public ﬁrm’s behavior directly,
and it also changes the private ﬁrm’s thorough strategic interaction between the ﬁrms. In this
section, we brieﬂy discuss the case in which the private ﬁrm is foreign.
When the private ﬁrm is foreign, the domestic social surplus is the sum of the consumer
10Even in the private duopoly, it is possible that both ﬁrms prefer to the more-eﬃcient ﬁrm’s leadership to
the less-eﬃcient ﬁrm’s one. For the pioneering studies in this ﬁeld, see Ono (1978,1982).
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surplus and proﬁt of the public ﬁrm. Thus, we modify the welfare function as follows.
SW = (p0 −m0)q0 +
[
α(q0 + q1)− β(q
2
0 + 2δq0q1 + q
2
1)
2
− p0q0 − p1q1
]
.
In this case, we ﬁnd the following:
Proposition 3 For any δ ∈ (0, 1), (i) both public and private leadership equilibria exist, (ii)
the private firm prefers the public leadership to private leadership, (iii) public leadership yields
larger domestic welfare than private leadership does, (iv)the public leadership equilibrium is
always risk-dominant.
The procedure to derive these results are similar to the results in the previous section, so
we omit it. The formal proof is available upon request for the authors.
The result that both private and public leadership equilibria exist holds true whether the
private ﬁrm is domestic or foreign. The result that public leadership equilibrium can be risk-
dominant is strengthened when the private ﬁrm is foreign. As we later discuss, the public ﬁrm’s
optimal output is less sensitive to the private leader’s output when the private ﬁrm is foreign
than when it is domestic. Thus, it becomes more diﬃcult for the private ﬁrm as the leader
to reduce the public ﬁrm’s output when it is foreign. Therefore, the private ﬁrm is further
reluctant to lead. This is why public leadership risk-dominates private leadership regardless of
δ.
However, the result that private leadership yields larger domestic welfare does not hold true
under foreign ownership, in which public leadership yields larger domestic welfare than private
leadership does. Similar to the domestic private ﬁrm case, the private ﬁrm here produces more
aggressively in the private leadership case than in the Cournot case (simultaneous-move case)
because the leader, the private ﬁrm, has an incentive to reduce the rival’s output. This more-
aggressive behavior of the leader results in less-aggressive behavior of the public ﬁrm. Because
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the public (resp. private) ﬁrm’s output is larger (resp. smaller) than the optimal output for
domestic welfare, changes in both ﬁrms’ outputs improve welfare. By contrast, the public
ﬁrm produces less aggressively in the public leadership case than in the Cournot case because
the leader, the public ﬁrm, has an incentive to increase the rival’s output. This less-aggressive
behavior of the leader results in more-aggressive behavior of the public ﬁrm. Thus, both public
and private leadership improve welfare and the private ﬁrm’s proﬁts than the Cournot case
does. In contrast to the domestic private ﬁrm case, we can show that the absolute value of the
slope of the public ﬁrm’s reaction curve is smaller than that of the private ﬁrm’s in the foreign
private ﬁrm case. Therefore, the leader’s strategic incentive for manipulating the follower is
larger (and thus, the welfare-improving and proﬁt-enhancing eﬀects are stronger) in the public
leadership case than in the public leadership case.
The key in this intuitive explanation behind Proposition 3 (ii, iii, iv) is that foreign own-
ership in the private ﬁrm makes the public ﬁrm’s optimal output less sensitive to the rival’s
output. We brieﬂy explain this property. An increase in the private ﬁrm’s output reduces the
marginal value of the product for consumers. Thus, an increase in the private ﬁrm’s output
reduces the public ﬁrm’s optimal output. This eﬀect is common in both the domestic and for-
eign private ﬁrm cases. In addition, when the private ﬁrm is foreign, an increase in the private
ﬁrm’s output increases the domestic value for lowering the rival’s price because a further re-
duction of the rival’s price reduces the outﬂow to the foreign investors, p1q1, more signiﬁcantly.
These two eﬀects are canceled out in the foreign private ﬁrm case. Thus, foreign ownership in
the private ﬁrm makes the public ﬁrm’s optimal output less sensitive to the rival’s output.
If we introduce partial foreign ownership in the private ﬁrm, we can show that Proposition
3 (i) holds regardless of the foreign ownership share, and Proposition 3(ii)–(iv) hold when the
foreign ownership share is large. When the share of foreign ownership is small, results similar
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to those presented in Section 3 hold. More detailed discussions for these results are available
upon request for the authors.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigated endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly. We introduced product
diﬀerentiation using Dixit’s (1979) model and found that regardless of the degree of product
diﬀerentiation, two equilibria (private and public leadership) exist, and private leadership is
better than public leadership for social welfare. These properties are seen in the previous
studies that investigated homogeneous product markets. Thus, these results seem to suggest
that product diﬀerentiation does not matter in this context. However, we showed that public
leadership is risk-dominant and thus more robust than private leadership when the degree of
product diﬀerentiation is high. This suggests that in highly diﬀerentiated markets, public ﬁrms
are more likely to take a leadership position.
We believe that the recent revival of public ﬁnancial institutions in Japan is well-explained
by this result. Recently developed ﬁnancial institutions, such as the Industrial Revitalization
Corporation of Japan, provide highly diﬀerentiated services and lead the market. Our result
also suggests that although welfare-maximizing public ﬁrms are more likely to lead in highly
diﬀerentiated markets, from a welfare viewpoint, the private ﬁrm should be the market leader.
In such a situation, the public ﬁrm’s commitment to not be the leader can improve welfare.
However, such a commitment reduces domestic welfare if the private ﬁrm is foreign. Public
leadership equilibrium risk-dominates the private leadership one, and the former is better for
social welfare. Thus, if the main competitors of the public ﬁrm are foreign, pubic leadership
should not be restricted for domestic welfare.
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